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IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES*
by
Leon Green"
T HE identification and formulation of the basic issues in negligence cases
mark the greatest weakness in the common-law litigation process. If issues
are not identified and formulated with considerable accuracy a case is almost
certain to come to grief. Practically all the negligence cases in which the
decisions are questionable involve errors in identifying or in the formulation
of the basic issues.
The basic affirmative issues in a negligence case are few, but lie so close
together that they are easily confused. The basic affirmative defensive issues
are correspondingly few and may also be confused. There are usually evi-
dentiary issues relevant to the determination of a basic issue and not infre-
quently an evidentiary issue is treated as a basic issue, with injustice to a
litigant.
The first affirmative basic issue of any negligence case is the identification
of the defendant and the causal connection between his conduct and the
plaintiff's injury. After both parties have closed, the trial judge must determine
if the evidence is sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. This
issue is a fact issue to be determined by the hindsight and good sense of the
jury. The evidence may also raise evidentiary issues which must be resolved
by the jury in its determination of this basic issue. In some cases causal con-
nection is clear, not contested, and even conceded, but it must be shown by
the facts even though not submitted to the jury. It is the gateway issue, and
if not at least provisionally established the case will proceed no further.
Assuming that causal connection is established or is an issue for the jury,
the plaintiff must then establish a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant
which protects the plaintiff against the risk of injury he has suffered. While
this is an issue of law for the court, the scope of protection is determined by
the court's evaluation of the facts of the case and of the various policies that
may be involved. It may be further noted that the determination of the scope
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff is a matter of hindsight, whether based
on the pleadings or the evidence introduced in the case. This function of the
court is sometimes ignored by the trial court or is left by design for determina-
tion by the appellate courts. Appellate courts, however, too frequently mis-
conceive the issue of the defendant's duty, and seek to affirm or reverse a
judgment with a labored opinion based on false issues supported by question-
able doctrinal refinements.
The violation of a duty (the negligence issue) is the heart of a negligence
case. Its consideration is deferred for full discussion. The issue of damages is
also very important, but cannot be considered in this brief Article.
The denials and affirmative issues of defense add greatly to the burdens of
* This Article is a by-product of a series of studies made by Professor Allen Smith and
the author entitled "Negligence Law-No-Fault and Jury Trial." Professor Smith is not to
be indicted for the views expressed here. All rights of republication are reserved by the
author.
* * B.A., Ouachita College; LL.B., University of Texas. Professor of Law, University of
Texas.
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a plaintiff in a negligence case. He can ill afford to err in the identification of
the basic issues of his case or permit the defendant or the court to do so. It
is said by some that since the plaintiff has the laboring oar the defendant
can drift until the plaintiff runs afoul of snags. Yet, the defendant who assumes
this attitude may find himself in a torrent without an oar. It is as important
for the defendant to have the issues identified and accurately formulated as it
is for the plaintiff. A case out of control is dangerous and unpredictable for
all litigants.
These general statements can be supported by cases taken from any Ameri-
can common law jurisdiction. An important recent decision by the California
Supreme Court will be examined at some length in support of some of the
more important statements; brief consideration of several recent decisions of
the Supreme Court of Texas will follow.
I. THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel' is one of those simple negligence cases in which
the issues were so inadequately defined that the trial of the case was a tragedy
of errors. Even the California Supreme Court could make little sense out of
what had been done correctly and had to settle for a reversal and new trial.
The case involved the drowning of Haft and his five-year-old son in the
swimming pool of the defendant Hotel,' which at the time of the drownings
was operated without any of the numerous safeguards required by statute.'
Only one witness saw Haft and his son while they were making use of the
pool, and it was he who later discovered them on the bottom of the pool.
At the trial the plaintiffs, Haft's wife and daughter, moved for a directed
verdict on the issue of liability, or in the alternative, for an instruction to the
jury that the defendants were negligent as a matter of law and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of the drownings. A further instruction
that the son was not contributorily negligent was also requested. The trial
judge refused plaintiffs' motions and the jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendants on both causes of action.
On appeal, the plaintiffs raised several contentions. They asserted initially
that the trial judge erred in not finding as a matter of law that the defendant's
most serious violation of the statute-the failure to provide lifeguards or to
erect a sign so notifying the guests-was the proximate cause of the deaths.
This is the basic proposition discussed by the court and the basis on which the
case was reversed. The court stated its conclusion as follows: "[A]fter plain-
tiffs proved that defendants failed to provide a lifeguard or to post a warning
sign, the burden shifted to defendants to show the absence of a lifeguard did
not cause the deaths.""
'3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
Although there were several defendants in the case, for convenience they will be re-
ferred to as Hotel.
8CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 24101.4 (West 1967) requires that a swimming
pool, for which no direct charge for use is made, shall provide for lifeguard service or shall
erect signs dearly indicating the absence of such service. Additional rules and regulations
were imposed on Hotel by CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17 (West 1971).
'3 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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If the basic issues of the case had been accurately stated, the court could
have resolved the case decisively for the plaintiffs without having to reach
the highly doubtful conclusion that the defendants had the burden to "show
the absence of a lifeguard did not cause the deaths." In support of this state-







Did the operation of its swimming pool by Hotel substan-
tially contribute to the deaths of Haft and his son?
In the operation of its swimming pool was Hotel under a
duty to provide safeguards for its guests, Haft and his son,
in their use of the pool?
Was Hotel negligent in the operation of its swimming
pool in failing to provide safeguards for the protection of
Haft and his son?
Did Haft in making use of the swimming pool contribute
substantially to his death and to the death of his son?
In making use of the swimming pool was Haft under a
duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of him-
self and his son from the risk of drowning?
Did Haft in making use of the swimming pool fail to ex-
ercise reasonable care for the protection of himself and his
son against the risk of drowning?
Issues 1, 2, and 3 are the basic affirmative issues of causation, duty, and
negligence a plaintiff must sustain in order to impose liability on a defendant.
Issues 4, 5, and 6 are the basic affirmative issues a defendant must sustain to
establish contributory negligence and defeat liability.
Causal Connection. The operation of the swimming pool for the benefit of its
guests was an affirmative undertaking by Hotel. In order to recover, the
plaintiffs were required to show the causal connection between operation of
the pool and the deaths of Haft and his son. That connection was required as
a basis for the consideration of all the other issues in the case.' The identification
of a defendant and proof of a causal connection between his conduct and the
victim's injury is a gateway issue that cannot be ignored in any negligence case,
but when established does not of itself impose liability! It is a factual issue
based on hindsight which may be supported by direct, circumstantial, or ex-
pert opinion evidence. Innumerable details of fact may be relevant in making
proof of Hotel's conduct in the operation of the swimming pool and its con-
nection with the deaths.
' This is true of any negligence case, as is indicated in cases dependent upon res ipsa
loquitur to sustain the negligence issue. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 349 F.2d 553
(5th Cir. 1965); Davis v. Memorial Hosp., 58 Cal. 2d 815, 376 P.2d 561, 26 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1962); Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 100 N.E.2d 113 (1951); Comet
Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Holmes, 203 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fastland 1947).6See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER). Dean Prosser does not clearly state that causal connection and proximate cause
are distinct concepts, but his discussion is good, and he does recognize that "causation is a




It will be noted that the court would require "the defendants to show the
absence of a lifeguard did not cause the deaths."' With great respect, it must
be said that the absence of a lifeguard or the failure to provide other safe-
guards caused nothing8 Negligence law is based on affirmative conduct, or
the failure to do something after an affirmative undertaking to perform. Here
the operation of the pool was Hotel's undertaking which caused the death of
the guests. The failure to provide lifeguards or the absence of other safeguards
by Hotel were highly relevant to the issues of Hotel's duty and the negligent
violation of its duty, but those issues could only be reached after causal con-
nection was established. The determination of causal connection is emphasized
because in many cases it is ignored, erroneously identified, confused with other
issues, or submerged by irrelevancies.! In this case the causal connection be-
tween the Hotel's operation of its pool and the deaths of Haft and his son
was incontestable, but apparently it became confused with "proximate cause,"
an entirely different concept, and one that if relevant at all cannot be reached
until later issues are considered."
Duty-and the "Issue" of Proximate Cause. Once the causal connection be-
tween Hotel's operation of its pool and the deaths is established, or at least
formulated for submission to the jury for its determination, the next basic
issue that must be considered and determined is whether the risks of the
drownings were within the scope of Hotel's duty to exercise reasonable care
in its operation of the pool." The decedents, as guests of Hotel, were entitled
to use the pool, and in view of the safeguards imposed by the legislature and
required of the Hotel in the operation of its pool, the risks incurred by them
fell within the scope of Hotel's duty. In fact, drowning was the extreme risk
against which Hotel was required to give protection. The determination of
this issue demanded the judgment of the court as a matter of law. Even if
73 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
'There are many statements by courts and writers indicating that omissions or the ab-
sence of protections are proximate causes. This cannot be true as to causal connection,
cause-in-fact, or causal relations (three synonyms for the same factual concept). Proximate
cause reflects "fault" and is frequently used to indicate a limitation of duty, or a defense
to the negligence issue. Dean Prosser recites many cases in which these usages are found,
though no doubt many courts and writers use proximate cause to indicate casual connection.
See PROSSER § 42, at 244-46.
'Until the defendant, the injury, and the connection of the two are identified none of
the other issues of a case can be considered. A close reading of PROSSER § 41, at 236-44,
will disclose all of these failures to recognize the importance of causal connection, a factual
concept, as a separate and distinct first step in the analysis of any case, and especially a
negligence case. To ignore it, or to tie it into any fault doctrine, generally leads to false
analysis. The seeming simplicity of causal connection as an issue is deceptive. This is due in
many instances to the fact that cause and fault are frequently used synonymously. In medieval
tort law, before the negligence action was developed, cause alone imposed liability. When
negligence law developed as a moderation of medieval strict liability, the two concepts had
to be separated. The great emphasis common-law lawyers and judges placed on fault as a
limitation of liability apparently made them forget that causal connection continued as an
essential requisite of negligence liability. Everyone, litigants, judges, advocates, law teachers,
law students, and negligence law itself, have suffered as a result of this confusion in the
usage of these concepts.
'oSee COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PAT-
TERN JURY CHARGES § 2.02, 3.01-.13 (1969) (hereinafter cited as TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES]. The proximate cause issue concludes each series of questions.
"See PROSSER § 42, at 244-50.
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there were no statutory safeguards required, Hotel would no doubt be required
to provide reasonable protection for its guests in making use of the pool.*"
It is a matter of some importance that the extent of a defendant's duty or
its coverage has often been treated as a question of proximate cause. 8 In many
of the early maritime insurance cases, whether certain risks fell within the
coverage of maritime insurance depended upon whether they were proximate
or remote, and if proximate, the insurer was liable for the loss.'" This concept
was carried over to the early fire cases, especially for fires set by railway
engines," and has been expanded to many types of negligence cases as a
solvent for almost any difficult issue that can be raised in a negligence case."
The concept has become so impossible to define, and so lacking in integrity,
that some courts have rejected it altogether.'7 Others give it only slight recogni-
tion,' and some courts continue to require that it be submitted to the jury as
a factual issue in all negligence cases." Its validity is widely questioned."
In Vesely v. Sager?' the California Supreme Court, in a far-reaching decision,
rejected a venerable and almost universal usage of proximate cause as a limita-
tion on the duty of a defendant who dispenses alcoholic beverages. Chief Jus-
tice Wright, speaking for the court, made the issue clear:
In this case we are called upon to decide whether civil liability may be imposed
upon a vendor of alcoholic beverages for providing alcoholic drinks to a cus-
18 Under the traditional application of the economic benefit doctrine the hotel guests
were invitees of Hotel and were owed the duty of reasonable care. See generally id. S 61.
" Id. § 42, at 244.
"
4 See, e.g., McDonald v. Snelling, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 290 (1867); Bird v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918); Lewis v. Ocean Accident &
Guar. Corp., 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56 (1918). The distinction is still used in insurance
cases as a basis for determining losses. See, e.g., Stroburg v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
464 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1971).
"sSee, e.g., Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1877). This case, with
its "true" rule, has been extremely influential in expanding proximate cause as an all-purpose
doctrine and a solution for all the difficult problems that arise in a negligence action.
The English think of this limitation on liability as a "measure of damages" and it serves
that purpose automatically, by excluding the risks for which damages cannot be recovered.
The doctrine was rejected in In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [19211 3 K.B. 560,
and also in Overseas Tank Ship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961) A.C. 388
(P.C.) (N.S.W.). This rejection was perhaps considerably modified in Overseas Tankship
(UK) Ltd. v. Miller Steamhip Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (P.C. 1966) (N.S.W.). These two
cases grew out of the same factual setting and are known as Wagon Mound No. 1 and
Wagon Mound. No. 2. The latter may have greatly modified the decision in the first and
to some degree resurrected Polemis which had been so often condemned. See Green, The
Wagon Mound No. 2, Foreseeability Revised, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 197.
16 PROSSER § 42, at 250. Dean Prosser indicates the classes of problems dealt with as
soluble by the proximate cause approach. The list, he says, is not exclusive. In concluding his
list he adds that "[olnly the first of these problems [causation in fact] has anything what-
ever to do with the factual relation of cause and effect. The attempt to deal with the others
in terms of causation is at the bottom of much of the existing confusion."
'7Louisiana, in Celeste Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972),
appears to be the most recent. See Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Ore. 603, 469
P.2d 783 (1970); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 467 P.2d 292 (1970).
See-also Probert, Causation in Negligence Jargon, A Plea for Balanced Realism, 18 U. FLA.
L. REV. 369 (1965); Note, Causation, Duty and Negligence, 45 ORE. L. REV. 124 (1966).
1" Judges Holmes and Cardozo preferred the phrase: "The law does not spread its pro-
tection so far." See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
See also Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 349 F.2d 820 (5th Cit. 1965); H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rennsselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
19 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 2.02, 2.03.
' See PROSSER § § 41-45.
"15 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
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tomer who as a result of intoxication, injures a third person. The traditional
common law rule would deny recovery on the ground that the furnishing of
alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the
third person."
After a very thorough and able consideration of proximate cause and the
many cases (including its own decisions) that have sought to give it validity,
the Chief Justice concluded that the central issue in the case was one of duty
rather than proximate cause: "Did defendant Sager owe a duty of care to
plaintiff or to a class of persons of which he is a member?"'
The Chief Justice found the duty, which had been rejected for a century,
in one of the purposes expressed in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act-"to
protect the safety of the people of this state.""U Courts in states in which such
a duty is not defined by a civil code, as it is in California, can and do find the
same purpose in modern common law.
In recent years the courts generally have come to realize that a similar ques-
tion arises in many cases in which the duty of a defendant is involved. It may
be a most difficult question to resolve. It calls for the important exercise of
a court's power to determine the limits of law, both common law and statute,
as a means of protection. It is a function that only a court can perform with
precision and a high degree of finality. Any merits proximate cause has had
in indicating the limitations of duty, or as the English say, the "measure of
damages," are duly credited, but for that purpose it has long been recognized
that whether a risk falls within the protection or scope of a defendant's duty
is a much more meaningful standard since it necessarily requires both a study
of the factual data, and the policies that may be affected. The courage and good
sense of the California court, reflected in Vesely v. Sager, should encourage
other courts to perform their functions fearlessly. In negligence law especially,
this regenerative process is a necessity if the obsolescences of the past century
are to be removed.
Negligence. Upon the establishment of a causal connection between Hotel's
operation of its pool and the deaths of Haft and his son, and its duty to pro-
vide protection to Haft and his son in the use of its pool, the issue of negligent
violation of Hotel's duty must be determined before liability can be estab-
lished. This is the negligence issue, the heart of a negligence action, and here
fault must be found as a requisite of liability. The court must first determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to raise and support an inference of negli-
gence. It is usually said that if "reasonable minds" can draw such an inference
the issue must be submitted to the jury for determination. The sufficiency of
1
2 Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625. Only a few years before, in Cole v.
Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955), the California Supreme Court had withdrawn
a forthright opinion imposing liability, and reinstated and accepted as the basis of liability
the clich6 that it was the drinking and not the selling of the intoxicant that was the proxi-
mate cause of the victim's injury.
The most difficult task the courts have is to get rid of numerous like statements by the
courts of the 1800's, which in this century are considered nonsense, as the basis for denying
tort liability.




the evidence to require submission to a jury, and to support a judgment based
on a verdict for the plaintiff, requires, in the first instance, the judgment of the
trial court, and later may require the judgment of the appellate court to sustain
the trial court's judgment.
Weighing the factual data in evidence, the relevance of former decisions,
and the policies that may be involved are basic functions of the litigation pro-
cess. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the function of the court
in submitting the negligence issue to the jury and its function in determining
the extent of the defendant's duty to protect the victim against the risk of
injury he has suffered. The two functions of the court are frequently confused,
but the distinction is clear. The weighing of policies in support of the extent
of duty involves making a decision that establishes a precedent while the
weighing of the factual data to determine the basis for submission to the jury
is limited to the particular case.
Once the issue of negligence is made by the evidence, the issue must be
submitted to the jury, unless the factual situation is such that reasonable minds
can draw but one inference. The submission of the negligence issue is the most
treacherous phase of a negligence case.' More fatal errors are made at this
stage of the litigation process in a negligence case than at any other stage.
In most jurisdictions, the litigants must be given a fair opportunity to have
their affirmative issues and their defenses considered by the jury without com-
ments by the trial judge on the weight of the evidence. This is difficult enough
when the common law and its refinements are involved. But when the con-
sideration of statutes, ordinances, and administrative regulations are relevant
to the scope of the defendant's duty and to the negligent violation of that duty,
the difficulties of submitting the negligence issue are greatly multiplied. The
negligence issue is usually simple, but it may be supported on several grounds,
any one of which may entail liability.
At common law the foreseeability of some risk of injury such as the victim
suffered is a necessary predicate to imposition of the duty of care, and the failure
to use care imposes liability to the victim for negligent violation of the duty.
The violation of a statutory duty to use care may in itself be negligent in that
the legislature has foreseen the risk of injury and has deemed the violation of
the duty to be negligent, whether the defendant could foresee the likelihood of
injury or not. This is doubtless the situation in Haft. But most statutes designed
to protect a victim from the risk of injury sustained for failure to use care
are subject to excuse, and their violation is determined by the common law.
While the finding of the jury is necessarily based on the jury's hindsight evalu-
ation of the evidence, its guidance is the foresight and conduct of the defendant
as a reasonably prudent person. Both the issue and the formula are compre-
hensive: Should the defendant as a reasonably prudent person, under all the
circumstances which conditioned his conduct, have foreseen some such risk of
5 See Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 30
(1963), in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PRocESs IN TORT LAW 391 (1965). See also




injury as the victim suffered, and did defendant fail to exercise reasonable care
to avoid such risk of injury as the victim suffered?
In Haft the factual data in support of the negligent violation of Hotel's
duty are weighty as a matter of common law, and practically conclusive in
view of the statutory safeguards required for the operation of Hotel's pool.
The pool was dangerous for both Haft and his son. No safeguards whatsoever
were provided by the Hotel for their protection, and as guests, their protection
could not be ignored. A court would be justified in directing a verdict for
plaintiffs on the issue, though out of an abundance of caution most courts
would probably submit the issue to the jury.'
Contributory Negligence. The fact that Haft knew his son could not swim
and that he himself could not swim well, and, further, that he must have
observed the absence of any safeguards, is apparently the only defense Hotel
had available. This was an affirmative defense of contributory negligence-with
the burden on Hotel to sustain the defense. It would be subject to the same
requisites of causal connection, duty, and violation of duty as were the affirma-
tive issues of the plaintiffs, as indicated in the basic issues 4, 5, and 6 at the
beginning of this discussion.
Causal connection between Haft's conduct in making use of the pool and
the drownings is incontestable. Haft's duty to protect himself and his son from
the risk of drowning must be conceded.
The failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid the risk of drowning is
subject to proof, with the burden on Hotel. There was no specific factual
evidence, however, to indicate that Haft did or did not exercise reasonable care
on behalf of himself and his son. The discovery of the bodies on the bottom
of the pool in deep water may be subject to considerable speculation, but
nothing sufficient to sustain Hotel's burden. The situation does not rise to the
level of res ipsa loquitur. With no specific evidence to support the issue of
Haft's negligence, together with the almost, if not conclusive, evidence of
Hotel's failure to exercise any care to protect its guests, the court would be
justified in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs on this issue.
The California court apparently was not satisfied to quit the case at this
point. Its argument proceeded with the supposition that the failure to provide
lifeguard service was of consequence only if such negligence was a "proximate
cause" of the drownings.7 This failure enhanced the chances of the drownings,
and suggested very strongly that a competent lifeguard would have prevented
the deaths, but that was as far as plaintiffs could go in proving the causal link
between an absent lifeguard and the deaths. To require plaintiffs to prove
"proximate causation" to a greater certainty would give defendants the ad-
vantage of the lack of proof in a situation they created.' "Under these circum-
263 Cal. 3d at 762, 478 P.2d at 468, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748: "In failing to satisfy all of
these mandatory safety requirements, which were clearly designed to protect the class of
persons of which the victims were members, defendants of course were unquestionably
negligent as a matter of law."2 71d. at 770, 478 P.2d at 473, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
11 Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
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stances," said the court, "the burden of proof on the issue of causation should
be shifted to the defendants to absolve themselves if they can."'"
The court made no distinction between causal connection and "proximate
cause"-that is, no distinction between the factual issue of causal connection
and the fault issue of proximate cause. It correctly placed the burden of proof
on Hotel but erroneously designated the issue as factual cause instead of fault.
This confusion of issues or double talk is not unusual. Nothing less than a
careful examination of the causation doctrines can clarify such puzzles.
The Causation Doctrines-Defenses. Once plaintiff has established (1) that
the defendant's conduct substantially contributed to plaintiff's injury, (2) that
the defendant's duty included the risk of injury inflicted by his conduct,
(3) that the defendant's conduct negligently violated his duty, and (4) that
the plaintiff's conduct did not defeat his action against defendant, what else,
other than the amount of damages plaintiff has suffered, must be established
before judgment is rendered for the plaintiff? The California court held (and
some other courts would agree) that plaintiff must still prove that Hotel's
negligence was the proximate cause of the deaths. The "proximate cause"
definition' given to clarify the issues is not stated in terms of factual causation.
Causal connection does not have to be "natural" in the sense of ordinary, or
follow a "continuous sequence" or "produce an event without which cause such
event would not have occurred," or "an omission that a person using ordinary
care would have foreseen that the event might reasonably result therefrom."
Such restrictive terms are the language of fault, not cause and effect. Proximate
cause is a defense available under the general issue at common law-and later
the general denial-and is relevant to the issue of the defendant's wrongdoing
or fault which the plaintiff must prove.
If the defendant has offered evidence that some third person or "event""
was responsible for plaintiff's injury, many courts would require the plaintiff
to prove also, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such third person or
event was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Even though this issue
is treated only as a denial of plaintiff's affirmative issues, and the evidence
supporting it necessarily must have been considered by the jury in the deter-
mination of plaintiff's issues, the negative issue must still be submitted affirma-
29 Id.
"TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 2.02, at 46, defines the term as follows:
'Proximate Cause' means that cause, which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not
have occurred; and in order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission com-
plained of, must be such that a person using ordinary care would have fore-
seen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom.
There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
" The term "event" is used quite generally to indicate any source of responsibility other
than a person, such as a mob or natural phenomenon. This does not mean that a defendant
is necessarily relieved of responsibility by showing that a victim suffered injury from either
the conduct of a third party or other source, for the risk of injury may still be within the
scope of the defendant's duty. Hence, usually the defendant claims that a third party or an
"event" was the sole cause or sole proximate cause of the victim's injury. The defense need
not challenge causal connection specifically at all; proximate cause challenges the whole
case by shifting responsibility from the defendant to some other person or "event."
1972)
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tively, although when submitted as a special issue the use of language is
perverted."2
The defensive causation issue, whatever its terminology, is directed at plain-
tiff's case as a whole. The issue may be stated in one of several variations, as
proximate cause, sole cause, sole proximate cause, but-for-which cause, inter-
vening cause, superseding cause, supervening cause, or some other cause thought
to be equivalent. These are known as the causation doctrines. They do not
directly challenge any one of the plaintiff's affirmative issues. Instead, they
challenge his whole case by asserting in a single issue the responsibility of
some other person or event for the plaintiff's injury, and only by inference
imply that the defendant is not responsible.
It will be noted that this defense introduces in effect a new case involving
only one issue, but that issue is a wholesale or global denial of defendant's
responsibility by shifting responsibility to another person or "event." How did
it come about that the plaintiff must bear the double burden of proving his
own case and disproving that the conduct of another person, or "event,"
introduced by the defendant, was not responsible for his injury? For many
years during the development of the negligence action, all defenses could be
given under the general issue or denial. Even the defense of contributory fault
was available under the general issues, placing the burden on the plaintiff to
plead and prove that the injury was not his own fault. Contributory negligence
as an affirmative defense, with its consequent burden of proof on the defendant,
was not recognized until the late nineteenth century, and in some jurisdictions
not until much later.3
The "causation defenses" were available under the general issue and later
the general denial, even though they brought into issue the conduct of a third
person or "an event" as a basis for shifting responsibility from the defendant.
Inasmuch as the conduct of a third party, or an event, is no less affirmative
than the conduct of the plaintiff himself, why did the courts not make a similar
shift in the burden of sustaining the causation defenses, as was done with the
contributory negligence defense? The answer is found in the fact that the
proximate cause defenses, the contributory negligence defense, and the other
early common-law defenses to a negligence case were easily convertible one
into another, and supported by much the same factual details. Thus, when the
" See TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES 5 2.02, which phrases the issue as follows:
"Without which cause such event would not have occurred." This clause is referred to as
the "but for" clause in the proximate cause definition. See also id. § 3.04: "Issue No. 2:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the action of Tim Thomas in stop-
ping his vehicle suddenly was not the sole proximate cause of the occurrence in question?"
This and other double negative causation issues cannot be answered "Yes" or "No." In-
structions are given to answer "It was not the sole proximate cause" or "It was the sole
proximate cause."
The Texas supreme court has recently held that "sudden emergency" and "unavoidable
accident" (another negative causation issue) are not independent issues entitled to be sub-
mitted. See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971). By implication, the
same can be said of all "causation issues" other than causal connection.
"3PROSSER S 65, at 416. In the opening sentences of the section Dean Prosser says the
defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence developed late in the law of
negligence. This is apparently an oversight. Both developed very early in the 1800's while
the negligence action was emerging from the common-law actions of trespass and trespass
on the case. The negligence action required another century to reach maturity.
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courts placed the burden of proof of contributory negligence on defendants,
advocates for defendants simply converted the contributory negligence defense
into proximate cause, sole cause, or some other causation defense. Likewise, the
conduct of a third person was convertible into proximate cause, assumed risk,
accident, and in some cases, last clear chance. Thus, all these defenses remained
available as denials under the general issue.
It is interesting to observe that when the state and lower federal courts were
attempting to apply the Employers Liability Act, which had made contributory
negligence only a basis for the diminution of damages, defense attorneys
simply converted contributory negligence into an appropriate causation de-
fense. When the Supreme Court eliminated the "causation defenses" and
recognized causal connection as the only legitimate cause issue, advocates, with
the accommodation of the courts, converted the causation defenses into assumed
risk, or accident, or no negligence. Congress then amended the Act to treat
assumed risk and the converted defenses as contributory negligence. The Su-
preme Court took over protection of the Act's integrity at that point." This
did not stop the convertibility of the common-law defenses into other such
defenses, but it made convertibility less decisive of the issue involved.
In the practice of negligence law in the state courts, common-law defenses
became so easily convertible into causation doctrines that negligence litigation
by shrewd trial and appellate lawyers was like playing with "loaded dice" or
"marked cards" when the opposing lawyers and many of the judges were not
experts in the litigation process. In recent years, both plaintiffs' attorneys and
the judges have become more sophisticated, but instead of getting rid of the
"loaded dice" or "marked cards," litigation has largely passed into the hands of
experts who know how to play the defenses and counter-defenses. The causa-
tion doctrines are the preferred "cards" inasmuch as only a master advocate can
play them to great advantage. The law reports are overflowing with the tragic
results of this near-paltering with justice. No other practice in an area so
close to the lives of those who daily must face the dangers of a mechanized
society has done so much to discredit lawyers, jury trial, and the courts.
Returning to the consideration of this problem in Haft, the court began its
discussion of the basic issues as follows: "Although the proof of the numerous
statutory safety violations established defendants' negligence as a matter of
law, this proof of negligence alone, of course, did not automatically establish
liability; plaintiffs still bore the initial burden of showing that defendants'
negligence was a proximate cause of the deaths."'
Under pressure of plaintiffs' contention that the evidence showed that the
failure to have a lifeguard at the pool was, as a matter of law, a proximate
cause of the deaths and that issue should not have been submitted to the jury,
the court concluded, as indicated early in this discussion, that "the burden
shifted to the defendants to show the absence of a lifeguard did not cause the
deaths," and reversed the case for a new trial.'
"This development i3 indicated more fully in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN
TORT LAW 371, 377-78 (1965); Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J.
482, 488 (1956).
" 13 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 469, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
"Id. at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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The court, in an attempt to justify the shift in the burden of proof, placed
reliance on the well-known case of Summers v. Tice," which involved two
hunters who shot at a bird flushed by plaintiff, who was hit in the eye by one
shot. Plaintiff sued both hunters, but could not prove which defendant shot
him inasmuch as both hunters fired simultaneously in the direction of plain-
tiff and were using the same size shot. Since the hunters and plaintiff were in
the same hunting party, the plaintiff was not required to show from whose gun
the shot came and the judgment against the hunter who appealed his case was
affirmed. But the Summers court went further and projected a case in which
two hunters, independently and without knowledge of each other's presence
in the woods, fired their guns under similar circumstances and with similar
results as the case before the court. The court concluded that the result would
have been the same. It will be noted that in Summers and the projected case
the problem is causal connection, a fact issue, and not a fault issue as is proxi-
mate cause. The court justified shifting the burden of proof of causal connec-
tion to the defendant in order to do justice. The same result could have been
reached by orthodox procedural practice, but the shifting to do justice was an
intelligent way to reach the result and no criticism is made of it.
Summers is valuable in another respect in that it indicates the confusion
courts have in distingushing between factual causation and proximate causation.
"Whose shot struck him in the eye" is an entirely different problem from
whether "Hotel's negligence was a proxmate cause of the deaths of Haft and
son." The California court apparently thought the two issues were the same.
As indicated early in this discussion, Hotel's operation of the pool was a sub-
stantial cause of the deaths. When causation, Hotel's duty, and the negligent
violation of its duty to provide safeguards at the pool for its guests were shown,
that should have ended the case in plaintiffs' favor. Liability was complete
unless Hotel sustained its burden of proof on the issue of contributory negli-
gence. Since the court had already indicated that the plaintiffs proved the
negligence of Hotel in not providing an important safeguard at the pool as
required by statute, why was the burden placed on Hotel to prove that the
absence of the safeguards did not cause the deaths of Haft and his son?
The holding of the court is made ambiguous by what is said, but what it
did was to place the burden on Hotel to prove affirmatively the defense that
its failure to have a lifeguard at the pool was not negligent. Although when a
proximate causation doctrine is unmasked it is usually seen to be foolish, it
is too much to make that charge against this court. What the court apparently
had in mind was that if Hotel was to be relieved of liability for failing to
have safeguards at the pool for its guests it must prove that it was not negligent.
To do this the court converted the defense of "no negligence" into one of
proximate cause, thus requiring Hotel to prove something that could not be
proved."
3733 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
38The court had already held that the plaintiffs could not prove that the absence of a
lifeguard was a proximate cause of the deaths. See notes 27, 28, 29 supra, and accompanying
text. It must have known that Hotel could not prove the contrary position.
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II. THE TEXAS EXPERIENCE
The California Supreme Court is not alone in its failure to identify the
issues in a negligence case, and to be taken on a "snipe hunt" for proximate
cause. The contrast in the identification of the issues in two recent Texas
cases reflects the importance of the correct identification of the issues. The
driver of an automobile, Gentry, and his passenger, Stanley, were killed by a
collision with defendant's train at a highway-railway crossing. Two actions
were brought, but were consolidated for trial." In the trial court the jury found
both the driver and the defendant railroad negligent. The jury also found
discovered peril issues in favor of the driver, but the trial court disregarded
the latter findings and rendered an n.o.v. take-nothing judgment for defendant
which was affirmed by the court of civil appeals.' On petition for review the
supreme court held there was no evidence that the train operators actually
discovered and realized the driver's peril in time to have avoided the collision
and affirmed the judgments below.4
In the action for the death of Stanley, the verdict of the jury was the same,
but the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the court
of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment
for the defendant." Since Stanley was not contributorily negligent, the court
of civil appeals held that the discovered peril issue was out of the case. The
plaintiff based her claim of liability on the finding of the jury that the engineer
failed to reduce the speed of the train at a time when a person of ordinary
prudence in the exercise of care would have done so to avoid the collision, and
the further finding that such failure was a proximate cause of the collision.
The defendant urged that there was no evidence to support the submission of
such issues and no evidence to support the jury's findings. The supreme court
held there was some evidence to support the issues and remanded the case to
the court of civil appeals to determine if the evidence was sufficient to support
the issues.'
The disposition of the two cases vividly demonstrates the necessity of identi-
fying the issues at each step of the litigation process through the trial and the
two appellate courts. Even with a meritorious distinction of the issues so nicely
made by the plaintiff, the court could not resist flexing its knees to the proxi-
mate cause obsession. It added: "The cause-in-fact element of proximate cause
is close; i.e. whether the collision would have been averted if the brakes had
been applied and the throttle adjusted at or after 1,000 feet from the cross-
ing." Such a consideration had no relevancy to the cause of the collision. The
39On appeal, the cases were ordered consolidated for purposes of briefing and oral argu-
ment, but were severed for disposition. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Stanley, 459 S.W.2d 232
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970); Gentry v. Southern Pac. Co., 449 S.W.2d 527
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969).
41 Gentry v. Southern Pac. Co., 449 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969).
" Gentry v. Southern Pac. Co., 457 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1970).
'Southern Pac. Co. v. Stanley, 459 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970).
4"Stanley v. Southern Pac. Co., 466 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1971). On remand, the court of
civil appeals found that the evidence supported the findings of the jury that the engineer
should have reduced the speed of the train and his failure to do so was a proximate cause
of the collision. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and affirmed on sub-
sequent appeal. Southern Pac. Co. v. Stanley, 473 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1971).
"466 S.W.2d at 554.
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cause of the collision and the death of Stanley was the combined conduct of the
driver and the conduct of the operators of the train. Whether the risk of a
collision should have been foreseen and measures taken to avert it by the
operators of the train were considerations relevant to the determination of
their duty and to the negligent violation of their duty.
In Texas & Pacific Railway v. McCleery' the plaintiff, a passenger in a
truck driven into the side of defendant's train, which was found to have been
traveling at twice the speed permitted by the Dallas ordinance, was denied
recovery for his injuries by the supreme court. The court identified the issue
as cause-in-fact, an element of proximate cause. Defendant's duty, violation of
duty (negligence), plaintiff's injuries, and the absence of contributory negli-
gence were in effect conceded, but the court held that "the burden was on the
respondent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the collision would
not have occurred but for the excessive speed of the train"' and "respondent
did not discharge his burden of proving that the excessive speed of the train
was a cause-in-fact of the collision and respondent's injuries; that is there is
in the record no evidence of probative force that but for the excessive speed the
collision would not have occurred." '47 With all respect, there was no such issue
and no such burden. In brief, the court ignored the actual collision as a cause
of plaintiff's injury and would require him to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that had the train been traveling at the legal rate of speed a collision
with the truck would not have occurred, a negative fact not subject to proof
and which at most could only exist in the imagination.
The basic issue involved in the case was whether the risk of injury plaintiff
suffered was within the scope of the defendant's duty. Did the ordinance im-
posing the speed limit, even though violated, include within its coverage and
protection the risk of a truck crashing into the side of a moving train at a
street crossing 415 feet from the lead engine? No support for such a holding
can be found. While the ultimate decision of the case was unquestionably
correct, the identification of the issue was erroneous, and the doctrinal theory
in support of the decision will be used to harass litigants and the courts and
do great injustice as long as it withstands repudiation.
In fact, the bitter fruit of the McCleery decision was not long in ripening.
In East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge the plaintiff, a patron of defendant's
movie theatre, was struck by a whiskey bottle thrown from the balcony by
an unidentified person. There had been a long history of rowdies in the balcony
throwing things on patrons below and defendant had provided measures,
including removal of rowdies, to prevent such irresponsible conduct by persons
admitted to the balcony. On that particular night there was a failure to police
the balcony. Yet, while the evidence was conclusive that the defendant was
negligent, and the court so assumed, it held there was no evidence to establish
the cause-in-fact element of proximate cause. The supreme court could find
no evidence identifying the bottle thrower, or that the bottle would not have
41418 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1967).
"Id. at 497.
4
"1d. at 498-99.48453 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1970).
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been thrown but for the failure to remove the rowdy persons from the balcony,
and made several statements to that effect; all were, of course, completely
irrelevant.
The issue was not who threw the bottle or whether he could be identified or
would have been removed. It was known that plaintiff's injury was caused by
a bottle thrown from the defendant's balcony. That was the cause-in-fact. The
defendant was under a duty to police the balcony and its duty was negligently
violated. The risk of a bottle being thrown from the balcony was clearly within
the protection of the defendant's duty and its failure to perform its duty was
sufficient to impose liability, or a jury could so find. The absence of evidence
on which the court based its decision involved speculations which the plain-
tiff could not prove and did not have to prove. The court interposed a fictitious
issue, ignored the only valid affirmative issue in the case, and reversed the
judgments of the courts below on the fictitious issue. Numerous cases of similar
import can be cited. 9
In Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs" the plaintiff sought damages against
the defendant for injury suffered by an explosion of its freon product, while
connecting the container to the wrong side of plaintiff's automobile air con-
ditioner compressor. The action was based on strict liability for failure to place
a warning on the freon container. The court held that it must be shown that
the absence of a warning on the container caused the explosion and the injury
to the plaintiff. The holding is obviously erroneous as the absence of a warning
caused nothing. It was the product that exploded and injured Jacobs. Causal
connection between defendant's conduct in marketing the product and plain-
tiff's injury could not be clearer. The basic issue was whether the marketing of
the product without a warning made it so unreasonably dangerous as to impose
strict liability on the defendant. If so, every element of liability was present:
causal connection, duty, violation of duty, and injury.
Bell v. Campbell" illustrates how the Texas courts fail to identify the basic
issues of a negligence case, submit numerous evidentiary issues, become en-
tangled in mislabeled "causes," and labor through three courts to reach a
decision that should have been final at the trial court level if the issues had
been accurately identified and submitted.
A pickup truck driven by Mrs. Campbell was rear-ended by an automobile
with trailer attached driven by Marshall. The pickup truck was knocked off the
highway. Marshall's automobile was stopped off the travelled portion of the
highway, but the trailer was turned over in one lane of the highway. Bransford,
Bell, and Payton attempted to remove the trailer, which was struck by an
automobile driven by Fore. Bell and Payton died of their injuries. Their bene-
ficiaries and Bransford brought actions against Mrs. Campbell, Marshall, and
"'See, e.g., Lenger v. Physicians Gen. Hosp., 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970) (patient
given solid foods in violation of doctor's orders and suffered separation of colon after a
section was removed by operation); Briones v. Levine's Dep't Store, 446 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.
1969) (lawnmower in clothing area of department store); Constant v. Howe, 436 S.W.2d
115 (Tex. 1968) (patient disoriented by shock treatments fell out of bed and suffered
broken hip); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 358 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1962) (child resident of apart-
ment cut by glass in efforts to open a negligently maintained hallway door).
50480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
'434 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1968).
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Fore to recover their damages." They settled with Fore, but continued their
actions against Mrs. Campbell and Marshall."5
The trial court rendered judgment for defendants Campbell and Marshall.
The court held as a matter of law that the negligence of Mrs. Campbell in
causing the first collision was not a proximate cause of the second collision;
and the jury did not find Marshall guilty of any negligence which the court
considered to be a proximate cause of the second collision. The judgment of
the trial court was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The supreme court
stated: "As the case reaches us, the controlling question is one of causation.
We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that, as a matter of law, no alleged
negligence on the part of either Marshall or Mrs. Campbell that was sub-
mitted or requested to be submitted to the jury was a proximate cause of the
second collision."54
With great respect for the three courts, we analyze the case as follows.
It was incontestable that the operation of the vehicles by Mrs. Campbell
and Marshall and their collision substantially contributed to the injuries and
deaths of the rescuers. Likewise, it was incontestable that the operation of Fore's
automobile and its collision with the trailer substantially contributed to the
injuries suffered by the rescuers. These were the only questions of causation
involved in the case.
Whether the injuries and deaths of the rescuers caused by the defendants in
the operation of their vehicles were risks within the scope of their duties owed
the rescuers was an issue of law for the trial judge, and later the judges of the
appellate courts. If found favorably to the defendants, they were entitled to a
directed verdict. If found favorably to the plaintiffs, or if the trial judge was
in doubt and the evidence would support an inference of negligence, the court
should have submitted the following issues to the jury:
(a) Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs.
Campbell was negligent in the operation of her truck so that it came into
collision with the automobile of Marshall and overturned his trailer as an
obstruction in the highway? Yes - No -
Instruction: Before you can answer the foregoing question "Yes" you
must find that Mrs. Campbell as an ordinary prudent person, under all
the circumstances that conditioned her operation of the truck, should have
reasonably foreseen some such risks of collision with Marshall's automobile
and the overturning of his trailer as an obstruction of the highway, and
you must further find that she failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid
such risks.
If you have answered the foregoing question "Yes" then answer the
following question:
(b) Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that in causing
the highway to be obstructed by the overturned trailer of Marshall, Mrs.
"I In order to avoid the repetition of the names of the victims, they will be referred to
as the rescuers.
3 Bell v. Fore, 419 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967), afl'd sub nom.
Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1968).
"434 S.W.2d at 118-19.
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Campbell was also negligent with respect to the collision of Fore's auto-
mobile with the obstruction and the injuries suffered by the rescuers while
they were engaged in the removal of the obstruction from the highway?
Yes - No
Instruction: Before you can answer the foregoing question "Yes" you
must find that Mrs. Campbell as an ordinary prudent person under all the
circumstances that conditioned her operation of the truck and the cre-
ation of the obstruction of the highway by Marshall's trailer, should have
foreseen the risk of the collision of Fore's automobile, or the collision of
some other traveller's vehicle, with the obstruction, and the risk of some
such injuries as were suffered by the rescuers while they were engaged in
the removal of the obstruction from the highway; and you must further
find that Mrs. Campbell failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid such
risks and injuries.
Similar issues and instructions should have been submitted if the evidence
was sufficient to support an inference arising from Marshall's conduct in the
operation of his automobile and trailer. Inasmuch as Fore, for all practical
purposes, conceded his negligence, it would not be necessary to submit an issue
covering his negligence.
Under the facts as indicated, there would have been no basis for the sub-
mission of other issues. All relevant arguments could have been regimented
affirmatively and defensively on the court's ruling on the scope of the defend-
ant's duties and the issues submitted.
What the court did is another matter. No statement other than the supreme
court's recital can reflect the steps taken in the litigation and how the court
reached its affirmance of the judgments below. A summary of what it did can
only dimly reflect the needless circumlocution that engulfed the litigation of
the case.
More than forty fragmentary evidentiary issues and several false issues were
submitted to the jury, but not a single basic issue was submitted. This is not
unusual. The Texas courts seem to think that every dispute of factual detail
presents an issue for submission to the jury. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
require basic, ultimate, or controlling issues to be submitted, but in negligence
cases the rule is ignored.'
The controlling question of causation" with which the court began its dis-
cussion became a multitude of causes spread through its opinion-proximate
cause, sole cause, unavoidable accident, volenti, new and independent cause,
active and immediate cause, intervening agency, concurring cause, efficient
cause, cause as a condition, foreseeability as a test of proximate cause, but-for-
which cause, superseding cause. A statement by the court is worthy of quotation
as a basis of comments to be made: "All acts and omissions charged against
respondents had run their course and were complete. Their negligence did not
actively contribute in any way to the injuries involved in this suit. It simply
55 TEx. R. Civ. P. 279.
"6434 S.W.2d at 118.
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created a condition which attracted Payton, Bell and Bransford to the scene,
where they were injured by a third party .... .",
How could it be said that things had run their course as long as the over-
turned trailer obstructed the use of the highway? By whose activity did it get
there? Would things be at rest as long as other highway travellers were in
peril? Was there no responsibility on the defendants to remove the trailer
from the highway? The court could not deny that the injuries of the rescuers
were substantially caused by the conduct of the defendants in the operation
of their vehicles. Nor did it deny that the defendants were under a duty of
care to other travellers using the highway or to the rescuers who attempted to
protect other travellers from injury, and defendants themselves from liability.
The court's answer is merely that defendants were not the proximate cause of
the injuries the rescuers suffered, but that Fore became the proximate cause
of their injuries.
While the court was answering in terms of cause, there is no doubt that it
was thinking in terms of fault-that the wrongdoer responsible for the res-
cuers' injuries was Fore. It was not the function of the judges to make this
judgment. It was a question of mixed fact and law for the jury. If it was a
question of law for the judges, why not say clearly that the risks of injuries to
the rescuers here involved were not within the scope of the duties of the de-
fendants in the operation of their cars on the highway?
III. CONCLUSION
Why do the courts of Texas and other jurisdictions engage in metaphysical
causation circumlocution in dealing with liabilities in negligence cases when
the more understandable concepts of causal connection, duties, and negligent
violation of duties provide the basis for every requisite of liability and defense
needed for staring issues and making judgments? Even more pointed, why
frequently, after using the more understandable terms to reach a judgment,
do the courts then attempt to translate the reasons for their judgments into the
phantom concepts of proximate cause and its brood of causes?
Nothing said here is designed as an attack on the judges or the courts. They
are the most trustworthy and dedicated institutions of our society. Their ob-
session with "causes" has its origin far back in human history. We are told
that the ancients of all peoples have believed that their disasters were caused
by the anger of their gods, and they sacrificed animals and even children to
appease the gods. Today we look elsewhere for the causes of our catastrophes.
The causes we seek afar are on our own doorsteps. The implications are stag-
gering.
The analysis of the numerous negligence cases decided by the courts of
civil appeals and the supreme court will indicate that proximate cause and its
spin-offs are fault defenses parading under the colors of causation.' It is be-
57 d. at 122.
5 8 Lower Valley Bus Lines v. Lewis, 485 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972);
Samford v. Duff, 483 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972); Short v. Potts,
473 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiles, 457
S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970), mrror ref. n.r.e.
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lieved that if the trial courts and advocates would take the time to identify,
formulate, and submit the basic controlling issues of negligence cases, with
such clarifying instructions as may be required to give the jury understanding
of the issues they are empaneled to decide, the time of trial and review and the
expense of litigating negligence cases could be reduced by fifty percent, and at
the same time the quality of justice improved. The supreme court controls the
procedures of all the courts and has the power to bring the administration of
negligence law into the twentieth century. Some of its decisions in recent years
give promise that it is moving in that direction. The greatest step it could
take in that direction would be to take the time to discover for itself that the
1*causation doctrines" have no part to play in the intelligent disposition of
negligence or other cases, and that when unmasked they are found either to be
false or to hold in eclipse some meritorious doctrine that can be more in-
telligently employed.
